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NOTES
The Case for Quick Relief: Use of Section 10(j) of the
Labor-Management Relations Act in Discriminatory
Discharge Cases
To reduce the frustration of remedies' caused by administrative
delays,' the National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) use of injunctions
authorized by section 10(j) of the Labor-Management Relations Act
(LMRA)3 has significantly increased in recent years. ' Section 10(j)
authorizes the Board to petition a federal district court for temporary
The Supreme Court has recognized that labor law violations must be remedied quickly
if the relief is to be effective. See NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421, 430 (1967).
See also Note, The Role of the Temporary Injunction in Reforming LaborLaw Administra-
tion, 8 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROB. 553, 558 (1972).
1 Routine National Labor Relations Board processing of unfair labor practice charges in-
volves a number of separate steps: First, the alleged victim of the violation files a charge
with the regional office of the Board. Then, the office investigates the charge and, if it is
found to be meritorious, the office issues a complaint. Next, a hearing is held at which the
charging party and the complainant present arguments to an administrative law judge who
then issues a written decision. If either party takes exception to the judge's decision, the
Board reviews the decision and issues an opinion and order. Finally, if the violator fails to
comply with the order, the Board must petition a federal court of appeals for an enforce-
ment order; failure to comply with the court order results in a contempt citation. See Nolan
& Lehr, Improving NLRB Unfair Labor Practice Procedures, 57 TEx. L. REV. 47, 48-50
(1979).
In fiscal year 1979, the median time elapsed from the filing of a charge to a Board deci-
sion was 385 days. Id at 50. If the case finds its way to the court of appeals, another year
may elapse before enforcement. See id. at 51.
29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1976). The statute states:
The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint.., charging that
any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, to peti-
tion any United States district court within any district wherein the unfair
labor practice in question is alleged to have occurred or wherein such person
resides or transacts business, for appropriate temporary relief or restraining
order. Upon the filing of any such petition the court.., shall have jurisdiction
to grant to the Board such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems
just and proper.
Id.
From 1975 to 1979, the Board authorized an average of 48 petitions for § 10(j) relief
per year. Irving, Use of Section 10[j) Injunction Proceedings, 4 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 9209,
at 15,942 (1979). From 1948 through 1961, there was an average of approximately three
authorizations under § 10(j) per year and from 1962 through 1975 the average was approx-
imately 16. Comment, Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act: A Legislative, Ad-
ministrative and Judicial Look at a Potentially Effective (But Seldom Used) Remedy, 18
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1021, 1027 n.29 (1978).
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injunctive relief after an unfair labor practice complaint has been
issued, and gives the court jurisdiction to grant the Board "such tem-
porary relief ... as it deems just and proper."5 Greater use of section
10(j) is a step long urged by legal commentators,' congressional commit-
tees responsible for overseeing the Board's administration of national
labor laws7 and union spokesmen.'
While section 10(j) has provided timely and effective enforcement
remedies in those cases where it has been invoked by the NLRB and en-
forced by the courts,9 it has not been utilized in many other cases which
also merit such action." The legislative history of section 10(j) reveals
that it was meant to provide temporary injunctive relief in every case
that could not be effectively remedied through the NLRB's lengthy ad-
judicatory procedures." Reinstatement of a wrongfully discharged
employee, the remedy generally ordered by the Board when an unlawful
discharge has been found," is a meaningless remedy if it is not ordered
5 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1976). This affirmative grant of jurisdiction was necessary since in
1932 Congress, by means of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, id. §§ 101-115, had for all practical
purposes, eliminated the use of labor injunctions by federal courts. See generally F.
FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930) (detailing the history of abuses
of labor injunctions which led to the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act).
' See, e.g., Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38, 130-31 (1964); Siegel, Section
10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act: Suggested Reforms for an Expanded Use, 13 B.C.
INDUS. CoM. L. REV. 457, 482 (1972); Note, supra note 1, at 570; Note, Temporary Injunc-
tions Under Section 10(j) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 196 (1969).
Investigatory committees that have recommended increased use of §10j) include the
"Pucinski Subcommittee" SUBCOMM. ON NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON ADMINISTRATION OF THE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT BY THE NLRB 52 (Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter cited
as PUCINSKI REPORT]. The "Cox Panel Report" recommended an amendment to the NLRA
to make § 10j) injunctions mandatory in some circumstances. See ADVISORY PANEL ON
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS LAW, SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE,
REPORT ON ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, S. DOC.
No. 81, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, 26 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Cox PANEL REPORT]. The most
recent congressional recommendation for increased use of § 10(j) came from the House of
Representatives when it passed overwhelmingly the Labor Reform Act (LRA), H.R. 8410,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 123 CONG. REC. H32,613 (daily ed. 1977). The LRA contained a
provision requiring the NLRB to seek § 10(j) injunctions forcing employers to reinstate
employees fired without just cause during organizing campaigns. LRA § 9. After a five
week filibuster in the Senate, the LRA was recommitted to committee. 124 CONG. REC.
89412 (daily ed. June 22, 1978).
' See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESs, HEARINGS ON
H.R. 8410, 258, 258-59 (Comm. Print 1977) (statement of Douglas Fraser); SUBCOMM. ON NA-
TIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. AND LAB., 94TH CONG., 1ST
SESs., 563, 570 (Comm. Print 1975) (statement of Victor Van Bourg).
' See, e.g., Taylor v. Circo Resorts, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 152 (D. Nev. 1978) (§ 8(a)(3) charge
filed Aug. 17, 1978; § 10(j) injunction issued Oct. 11, 1978).
" See notes 63-67 & accompanying text infra.
" See notes 18-48 & accompanying text infra.
2 See generally D. MCDOWELL & K. HUHN, NLRB REMEDIES FOR UNFAIR LABOR PRAC-
TICES 103-21 (1976).
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promptly.13 Nevertheless, the procedures the Board has developed for
gleaning discriminatory discharge cases which merit section 10(j) ac-
tion from its huge unfair practice caseload 5 have resulted in arbitrary
selection of certain section 8(a)(3) 8 unfair labor practice cases, while
other equally deserving cases are ignored."1 The courts have compound-
ed this problem by adopting inappropriate and overly restrictive stan-
dards to determine when section 10(j) relief is "just and proper." Thus,
many unlawful discharge complaints which could be remedied with time-
ly injunctive relief are allowed to proceed slowly through the Board's
routine procedures, and injunctive relief is denied by the courts in some
cases where the relief should be granted.
This note argues that the legislature intended for section 10(j) to give
the NLRB the discretion to seek temporary injunctions against unfair
labor practices whenever it determined that the delay caused by its own
procedures would prevent a violation from being effectively remedied;
thus, the Board has abused its section 10(j) discretion by failing to con-
sider most discriminatory discharge cases for possible section 10(j) ac-
tion. This note then analyzes judicial criteria used to determine if sec-
tion 10(j) injunctions should be issued and argues that most of these
standards contradict the legislative purpose of the section as well as set-
tled principles for hearing administrative agency petitions for statutori-
ly authorized injunctive relief.
" Empirical studies have demonstrated that unless reinstatement of a wrongfully
discharged employee is ordered within a short time after his discharge he probably never
will regain the status of a permanent employee. See, e.g., Stephens & Chaney, A Study of
the Reinstatement Remedy Under the National Labor Relations Act, 25 LAB. L.J. 31 (1974);
accord, Amendments to Expedite the Remedies of the National Labor Relations Act: Hear-
ings on H.R. 7152 Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Educa-
tion and Labor, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 265, 265-73 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on
H.R. 7152] (statement of Rep. Les Aspin). One study in Board Region 1, New England,
showed that although 85% of a group of 194 persons who had been discriminated against in-
itially requested reinstatement, only 85 eventually were reinstated and 60 of those left
after two years due to employer harrassment. Id. at 266-67. Similar results were found in
Region 16, Northern Texas: Of 217 persons discriminated against, 70 were eventually
reinstated and 60 left within two years because of unfair company treatment. See Stephens
& Chaney, supra, 33-36. Both of these studies recommended increased use of § 10(j). See
Hearings on H.R. 7159 supra, at 272 (statement of Rep. Les Aspin); Stephens & Chaney,
supra at 40.
"' See notes 69-72 & accompanying text infra.
'" The Board processed 39,652 unfair labor practice cases in fiscal year 1978. 43 NLRB
ANN. REP. 1 (1978). Only 11,357 such cases were processed in 1960. Nolan & Lehr, supra
note 2, at 50. This increase led one member of the Board to observe: "There can be no doubt
that theBoard's surging caseload seriously threatens its ability to discharge its statutory
responsibilities." Penello, The NLRB's Misplaced Priorities, 30 LAB. L.J. 3, 3 (1979).
"6 Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976), states in relevant part: "It
shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-by discrimination in regard to hire or
tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment-to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization." Id.
" See notes 63-67 & accompanying text infra.
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THE CONGRESSIONAL INTENT UNDERLYING SECTION 10(j)
Section 10(j) originated in the Senate version of the LMRA18 and only
the Senate Report on the Senate bill discusses section 1O(j) explicitly."9
The lack of explicit reference to the section in the legislative history of
the Taft-Hartley Act"0 beyond that in the Senate Report has been inter-
preted as an indication that the Taft-Hartley Congress did not intend to
encourage the Board to utilize the discretionary authority to seek tem-
porary injunctions that was authorized by section 10(j). 1 Those who sup-
port this interpretation reason that if Congress had intended to reverse
the then prevailing policy against the use of temporary injunctions in
labor disputes," there would be a clear indication of that intent in the
" S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1947), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT OF 1947, at 130 (1974) [hereinafter cited as LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
There was no section comparable to § 10j) .in the House bill. See H.R. 3020, 8-0th Cong.,-
1st Sess. (1947), reprinted in LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 31. The section was ac-
cepted by the House members of the conference committee and was recommended without
comment to the House. See H.R. CONFERENCE REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1947),
reprinted in LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 561.
Experience under the National Labor Relations Act has demonstrated that
by reason of lengthy hearings and litigation enforcing its orders, the Board
has not been able in some instances to correct unfair labor practices until after
substantial injury has been done. Under the present act the Board is em-
powered to seek interim relief only after it has filed in the appropriate circuit
court of appeals its order and the record on which it is based. Since the
Board's orders are not self-enforcing, it has sometimes been possible for per-
sons violating the act to accomplish their unlawful objective before being placed
under any legal restraint and thereby to make it impossible or not feasible to
restore or preserve the status quo pending litigation.
In subsections (j) and (1) to section 10 the Board is given additional authority
to seek injunctive relief. By section 10(j), the Board is authorized, after it has
issued a complaint alleging the commission of unfair labor practices by either
an employer or a labor organization or its agent, to petition the appropriate
district court for temporary relief or restraining order. Thus the Board need
not wait, if the circumstances call for such relief, until it has held a hearing,
issued its order, and petitioned for enforcement of its order.
S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1947), reprinted in LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 18, at 433.
See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976).
21 NLRB General Counsel Denham stated in 1947:
I find it difficult to believe that Congress intended that injunctive relief
would be invoked as a preliminary cease and desist order every time a labor
organization is charged with an unfair labor practice. The history of labor in-
junction is too long and reveals too much the national desire to reduce govern-
ment by injunction to a minimum to justify any theory other than that this
provision is placed in the Act for emergency purposes and only where loss or
damage or jeopardy to the safety and welfare of a large segment of the public
would result if injunctive action were not taken.
I. ROTHENBERG, LABOR RELATIONS 632 n.4 (1949).
' That policy was codified in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976); see
note 5 supra.
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legislative history of the LMRA. The Board at one time subscribed to
this reasoning and sought few temporary injunctions" except in the cir-
cumstances covered by section 10(l) of the LMRA,24 which requires that
petitions for temporary injunctions be filed against unions when they
engage in secondary boycotts and jurisdictional disputes.25
The legislative purpose of section 10(j) cannot be adequately under-
stood by reviewing only the explicit references to that section in the
legislative history of the LMRA." These references must also be read in
the context of the other relevant provisions of the LMRA and the
debates and maneuverings which led to the passage of section 10(j)Y
Enactment of Section 10(j)
The LMRA was enacted in reaction to the increased industrial strife
that followed World War II,' by a Republican legislature determined to
end what the congressional majority considered abuses of power by
organized labor. The majority believed that the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA) unduly favored unions and disadvantaged manage-
ment; the LMRA was intended to eliminate this imbalance in the na-
tional labor laws.31 Sections 10(j) and 10 (1) were intended to effect a com-
2 See Comment, supra note 4, at 1032-34.
- 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (1976).
2' See i& Section 10(l) also requires the NLRB to investigate charges alleging a jurisdic-
tional strike or secondary boycott before it investigates any other charges which may be
pending. Id. Priority investigation and mandatory injunctions have led to § 10(1) being utilized
in thousands of union unfair labor practice cases since 1947. W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW 697 (6th ed. 1974). Only 11 of the 47 petitions filed under § 10j) between
1947 and 1962 were filed against employers. Note, supra note 1, at 564 n.97.
Cf. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 284-85 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(analyzing legislative history of § 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000d (1976): "[I]solated statements of various legislators ...must be read against the
background of both the problem Congress was addressing and the broader view of the
statute that emerges from a full examination of the legislative debates.").
7 See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979) (discussing § 703(a) & (d) of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 200e-2(a) & (d) (1976)); International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 350-53 (1977) (discussing 4 703(h) of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 20OOe-2(h) (1976)).-
" The need for congressional action has become particularly acute as a result
of increased industrial strife. In 1945, this occasioned the loss of approximately
38,000,000 man-days of labor through strikes. This total was trebled in 1946
when there were 116,000,000 man-days lost and the number of strikes reached
the unprecedented figure-of 4,985.
S. REP. No. 105, supra note 19, at 2, reprinted in LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
18, at 408.
See generally Mann, Taft-Hartley and the 80th Congress, in H. MILLIS & E. BROWN,
FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY 363, 363-92 (1950).
"0 Wagner Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1976)).
M' [T]he administration of the National Labor Relations Act itself has tended to
destroy the equality of bargaining power necessary to maintain industrial
1981]
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promise between the anti-union congressional majority and organized
labor's defenders in Congress, who were clearly a minority.2 The ma-
jority wanted to suspend the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act 3 by restoring to employers the right to petition courts
for temporary injunctions against secondary boycotts and jurisdictional
disputes. 4 The minority, on the other hand, fearing a return to "govern-
ment by injunction,"3 5 sought to retain the Board's exclusive jurisdiction
to remedy all unfair labor practices. After extensive Senate debate, 3
and after an amendment was offered by Senator Taft,' the Senate spon-
peace. This is due in part to the one-sided character of the act itself, which,
while affording relief to employees and labor organizations for certain
undesirable practices on the part of management, denies to management any
redress for equally undesirable actions on the part of labor organizations.
S. REP. No. 105, supra note 19, at 2, reprinted in LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
18, at 408.
12See H.R. MINORITY REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 110 (1947), reprinted in LMRA
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 18, at 401; S. MINORITY REP. No. 105 (pt. 2) 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 18-19, (1947), reprinted in LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 18, at 480-81.
Ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976)).
The House bill offered nothing comparable to § 10(j), see note 18 supra, rather, it con-
tained sections which would have suspended the Norris-LaGuardia Act by allowing
employers to seek injunctions as private litigants against union unfair labor practices, see
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 12(4}(b)-(c) (1947), reprinted in LMRA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY supra note 18, at 206-07. A number of senators, led by Senator Ball of Minnesota,
sought to amend the Senate bill to allow employers to seek injunctions in secondary
boycotts and jurisdictional strikes. See 93 CONG. REC. 4887 (1947), reprinted in LMRA
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 18, at 1323-24. See generally Mann, supra note 29, at 491.
1 This phrase was first given currency by a conservative leader of the English bar who
opposed the use of broadly worded injunctions in labor disputes. See Dunbar, Government
by Injunction, 13 LAW Q. REV. 347 (1897). See generally F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE,
supra note 5, at 86-133.
"' Abuses of labor injunctions prior to the Norris-LaGuardia Act were often cited by op-
ponents of the Ball Amendment. See generally 93 CONG. REC. 4887-5048 (1947), reprinted in
LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 18, at 1323-69.
3, See 93 CONG. REC. 4887-5045 (1947), reprinted in LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 18, at 1323-65. Typical of the debate is the following exchange between Senator Morse,
a proponent of S. 1126, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. (1947), reprinted in LMRA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 18, at 130, including §§ 10(j) and 10(l), and Senator Ellender, a propo-
nent of the Ball Amendment:
[Mr. MORSE:] Does the Senator agree with me that we must make clear to the
Senate that the choice which must be made is whether we are going to try to
do this by an administrative approach, or by way of a so-called court ap-
proach?
Mr. ELLENDER: That seems to present the whole issue ....
. The only argument I heard against the provision which is contained in
the pending bill was that the other proposal would provide a quicker process;
that under it an employer could go into court today and obtain an injunction
tomorrow and stop the threatened action.
93 CONG. REC. 4256 (1947), reprinted in LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 18, at
1057-58. The administrative "approach" referred to by Senator Morse was, of course, the
remedying of unfair labor practices by the NLRB, while the "court approach" was the use
of judicial injunctions obtained by private litigants.
" See 93 CONG. REC. 4887 (1974), reprinted in LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
18, at 1346. The Taft Amendment was later adopted. See 93 CONG. REC. 5049 (1947),
reprinted in LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 18, at 1370.
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sor of the LMRA, a compromise was reached which resulted in the adop-
tion of the relatively balanced approach embodied in sections 10(j) and
10(). 9 The Board retained exclusive jurisdiction to remedy all unfair
labor practices, but the majority's determination to eliminate secondary
boycotts and jurisdictional disputes was manifested in section 10(/)'s re-
quirements that the Board give investigative priority to employers'
complaints alleging such union unfair labor practices and that it seek an
injunction against the union if a complaint is issued."0 Employers were
thus protected against secondary boycotts and jurisdictional disputes
during the interval that the Board processed the underlying unfair labor
practice complaint. The Taft Amendment further placated the majority
by allowing employers to recover treble damages from unions for any
losses caused by secondary boycotts or jurisdictional strikes.4'
In this context, the discretionary authority given to the Board under
section 10(j) to seek temporary injunctions against any other unfair
labor practices by unions or employers appears to have been an attempt
to conform the injunctive provisions of the LMRA, at least superficially,
to the Act's objective of making the federal labor laws fair to both labor
and management.2 Although the significance of this compromise is not
entirely clear,43 it would be wrong to read the legislative history of the
LMRA as indicating a congressional intent to retain unabridged the
policy against the use of injunctions as a means of resolving labor
disputes." The Taft-Hartley Congress clearly favored the increased use
of injunctions against certain union unfair labor practices, and it was
forced by the dynamics of the legislative process"5 to accede to the
- 29 U.S.C. § 160(j), (1) (1976).0 Id. § 160().
C Oh. 120, Title I, § 303, 61 Stat. 158 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1976)).
" It would have been a transparent contradiction of Congress' intent "to equalize legal
responsibilities of labor organizations and employers," S. REP. No. 105, supra note 19, at 1,
reprinted in LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 18, at 407, to prescribe unequal
remedial procedures for union and management. Hence, Congress inserted the language
stating that § 10(j) was available to the Board to stop unfair labor practices by "either an
employer or a labor organization," S. REP. No. 105, supra note 19, at 27, reprinted in LMRA
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 18, at 433.
,3 It is arguable that since the congressional majority was concerned with eliminating
union unfair labor practices, § 10(j) should not be read as an encouragement for the Board to
seek injunctive relief against employers. Yet the ability of the minority to force a conces-
sion from the majority must also be given some consideration in attempting to discern the
purpose of § 10(j). Where such conflicting motivations of individual legislators or groups of
legislators prevail, the formal reports of the houses provide a useful and generally reliable
basis from which to interpret their collective intent. See F. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETA-
TION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 158 (1975). Thus the Senate report's statement that §
10(j) is available against both employers and unions may resolve the question of the
Senate's intent. The House can be presumed to have concurred in this intent since it was
silent on this issue. See notes 18-19 & accompanying text supra.
" Cf. McCleod v. General Elec. Co., 366 F.2d 847, 849 (2d Cir. 1966) (§ 10(j) did not change
federal labor law policy disfavoring use of injunctions in labor disputes), vacated & remand-
ed, 385 U.S. 533 (1967).
,3 See notes 28-42 & accompanying text supra.
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demands of the prolabor minority that only the Board be given the
authority to petition for temporary injunctions and that the Board be
allowed to seek injunctions against employer unfair labor practices if it
were to be required to seek them against unfair union practices.'
Ultimately, then, in accordance with the process by which most labor
legislation in this country typically is passed,'7 Congress left the effect
to be given section 10(j) to the discretion of the Board."
NLRB PRACTICE IN SECTION 10(j) CASES
Though the Board was initially reluctant to seek section 10(j) injunc-
tions,49 this reluctance was eroded somewhat in the early 1960's when a
sharp increase in its caseload" coincided with encouragement from con-
gressional oversight committees to increase its use of the section."
Since 1976, when an advocate of increased section 10(j) use was ap-
pointed NLRB General Counsel,52 petitions have been filed with increas-
ing frequency.5
11 "By section 10(j), the Board is authorized, after it has issued a complaint alleging the
commission of unfair labor practices by either an employer or a labor organization or its
agent, to petition the appropriate district court for temporary relief or restraining order."
S. REP. No. 105, supra note 19, at 27, reprinted in LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
18, at 433 (emphasis added).
47 [Sltatutes are necessarily flexible and vague, and this is particularly'likely in
the United States where the process of enacting labor legislation is such a
heated and partisan affair. In this atmosphere, Congress is especially prone to
avoid troublesome conflicts by resorting to vague phrases or employing ter-
minology so loosely drafted as to require the Board to indulge in freewheeling
methods of interpretation.
Note, supra note 1, at 556 n.25 (quoting Derek C. Bok).
For an explanation of congressional deferral to administrative expertise, see H.
FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 11-14 (1962).
, See note 4 supra.
There were five years of steady increase in case intake, climbing from 13,356 in 1958
to 24,848 cases in 1962. 27 NLRB ANN. REP. 5 (1962).
51 See note 7 supra.
5 John Irving, appointed in December, 1976, believed that S. REP. No. 105, supra note 19
"succinctly set forth" the purpose of both § 10(j) and § 10(l). Irving, Remedies and Com-
pliance-Putting More Teeth into the Act, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL
INSTITUTE OF LABOR LAW 349, 357-58 (Southwestern Legal Foundation 1977). Besides in-
creasing the number of § 10j) authorizations, Irving streamlined the manner in which
regional attorney's requests for § 10(j) authorization were processed by the General
Counsel and the Board. Id at 360. The authorization for a regional Board office to file a §
10(j) petition must be obtained from the Board's General Counsel in Washington, who must
then obtain Board approval for the action. The procedure followed by the Board in § 10(j)
cases is described in NLRB CASE HANDLING MANUAL (CCH) 3102 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as CASE HANDLING MANUAL].
Irving's pro-§ 10(j) philosophy eliminated a bottleneck; though the Board routinely ap-
proved previous General Counsels' requests for § 10(j) authorization, regional directors' re-
quests for § 10(j) authorization were denied by the General Counsel's office 90% of the
time. See Siegel, supra note 6, at 461.
" See note 4 supra.
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The Development of the NLRB's Section 10(j) Guidelines
The increase in the number of section 10(j) petitions filed in the early
1960's led judges' and labor lawyers55 to urge the Board to disclose its
criteria for determining which unfair labor practice cases warranted
section 10(j) action. The office of the NLRB's General Counsel first
responded with a list of factors which "an analysis of past cases" in-
dicated had been "considered" in deciding whether to seek section 10(j).
relief." These factors later were adopted as the Board's "Guidelines for
the Utilization of Section 10(j)."5 7 They include "the clarity of the alleged
violation; . . .whether the [alleged unfair labor practice] involves the
shutdown of important business operations [or] creates special remedy
problems so that it would probably be impossible either to restore the
status quo or effectively dissipate the consequences of the unfair labor
practices" and other factors, including "exceptional hardship to the
charging party."' These factors represent a fair approximation of the
legislative purpose of section 10(j). 9
Nevertheless, whenever the General Counsel's office has published
these factors, it has done so with the qualifications that they "are not all
inclusive, nor does the presence of one or more factors ... require that
we institute 10(j) proceedings."' By qualifying its guidelines in this man-
ner, the General Counsel's office has emphasized the discretionary
nature of the Board's authority to seek injunctive relief under section
10(j)61
" See, e.g., McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 257 F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 366 F.2d 847
(2d Cir. 1966), vacated & remanded, 385 U.S. 533 (1967).
It seems desirable-it would surely be helpful-for the Board, after nearly
twenty years of work with Section 10(j), to formulate and state in some form
more authoritative than random speeches by members the criteria by which it
determines whether to proceed under this Section. Such a formulation would
guide the public, the courts, the agency itself, and give a measure of assurance
that the action taken in individual cases is reasonably principled.
257 F. Supp. at 708 n.14 (Frankel, J.).
I See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 6, at 461 n.35 (describing author's struggle with then
NLRB Chairman Miller to obtain a copy of unreleased portions of Board's § 10(j) criteria).
" General Study into the Procedures of the NLRB and Its Administration of the Labor-
Management Relations Act of 1947, as Amended.- Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Na-
tional Labor Relations Board of the House Comm. on Education and Labor (pt. 2), 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1234-37 (1961) (statement of Stuart Rothman, General Counsel, NLRB).
These hearings were the source for the PUCINSKI REPORT, supra note 7.
"7 CASE HANDLING MANUAL, supra note 52, 3103.
8 Id.
" The Guidelines are a praiseworthy attempt to give substance to the Board's discre-
tionary authority to seek § 10(j) injunctions. The NLRB was left by the Taft-Hartley Con-
gress to be guided by its informed discretion as to when it would seek § 101j) injunctions.
See notes 44-48 & accompanying text supra.
"CASE HANDLING MANUAL, supra note 52, 3103.
" "It should be kept in mind that [§ 10(j)] relief is discretionary, not mandatory:' Id.
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The NLRB's Exercise of Its Discretionary Section 10(j)
Authority In Discriminatory Discharge Cases
An analysis of the Board's section 10(j) practice in discriminatory
discharge cases" reveals that the Board is arbitrary in its selection of
section 8(a)(3) cases for section 10(j) action. All but a few of the reported
section 10(j) cases involving section 8(a)(3) complaints filed during fiscal
years 1977 through 19796" can be matched with equally meritorious sec-
tion 8(a)(3) cases 4 from the same period" with comparable factual cir-
cumstances6 where the Board did not invoke section 10(j) 6 7
'" Review of the Board's § 10(j)-§ 8(a)(3) practice is appropriate because of the ineffec-
tiveness of normal Board procedures in remedying § 8(a)(3) violations, see note 13 supra,
and because advocates of increased § 10(j) use have singled out § 8(a)(3) cases as especially
suited for § 10(j) action. See Cox PANEL REPORT, supra note 7, at 12, 26; PUCINSKI REPORT,
supra note 7, at 51-52; Bok, supra note 6, at 130-31; Siegel, supra note 6, at 466, 480-81; Note,
supra note 1, at 572.
1 In fiscal year 1977 (beginning October 1, 1976) there were 22 § 10j) petitions filed in-
volving § 8(a)(3) violations. 42 NLRB ANN. REP. 311 table 20 (1977). There were 30 such peti-
tions filed in fiscal year 1978. 43 NLRB ANN. REP. 283 table 20 (1978). By June 30, 1979, of
fiscal year 1979 there had been 61 § 10(j) petitions of all kinds filed, Irving, supra note 4, at
15,953, of which 53 appear to have involved § 8(a)(3) complaints. Id. app. B (on file with the
Indiana Law Journal).
In 20% of the cases where § 10(j) petitions are filed, the charged party agrees to settle
the § 10(j) portion of the case. Id. at 19,942. Other district court decisions in § 10(j) cases
have not been reported. Thus, of the 105 § 10(j)-§ 8(a)(3) authorizations by the Board during
the period studied, 74 have been reported in enough detail to determine the factual cir-
cumstances of the cases involved. Those cases include: Barbour v. Central Cartage, Inc., 583
F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1978); Gottfried v. Mayco Plastics, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 1161 (E.D. Mich. 1979);
Fuchs v. Hood Indus., Inc., 471 F. Supp. 186 (D. Mass. 1979); Levine v. C & W Mining Co.,
465 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ohio 1979); DeProspero v. House of Good Samaritan, 102 L.R.R.M.
2154 (N.D.N.Y. 1978); Humphrey v. United Credit Bureau of America, 99 L.R.R.M. 3459 (D.
Md. 1978); Taylor v. Circo Resorts, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 152 (D. Nev. 1978); Siegel v. Marina Ci-
ty Co., 428 F. Supp. 1090 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Crain v. Fabsteel Co., 427 F. Supp. 316 (W.D. La.
1977); Leventhal v. Car-Riv Corp., 96 L.R.R.M. 2899 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Seeler v. Williams, 97
L.R.R.M. 2764 (N.D.N.Y. 1977). The remaining cases are collected in Irving, supra note 4,
app. B (on file with the Indiana Law Journal):
" There have been at least 186 § 8(a)(3) cases filed during fiscal years 1977 to 1979 and
decided by the Board. See NLRB, CLASSIFIED INDEX OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DECISIONS AND RELATED COURT DECISIONS ch. 524, § 5073-2200, at 499-511 (Jan. 1977-Dec.
1979) [hereinafter cited as NLRB INDEX]. In 178 of those 186 cases, the Board found a §
8(a)(3) violation. Id Cases in which the complaint was filed before October 1, 1976, were not
counted in compiling these figures.
" It is necessary to compare administrative decisions from the same period to eliminate
the possibility that inconsistency in those decisions represents a shift in administrative
policy. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 587 (abridged student ed.
1965).
Of course, no two cases are identical in every detail:
[Clases are seldom identical, particularly in complex areas of administration
where by hypothesis there are so many variables. To test whether the dif-
ference among a group of cases is "significant" and thus justifies differing
results (in the court's judgment), how many cases must one compare and how
far back is one entitled or required to go?
Id However, the reasons for the "differing results" in the Board's choices of § 8(a)(3) cases
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This inconsistency is a consequence of the regional NLRB office pro-
cedures for processing unfair labor practice cases that are identified as
potentially meriting section 10(j) action. The NLRB Case Handling
Manual instructs regional Board staff to initiate the procedures for ob-
taining authorization for filing a section 10(j) petition "immediately upon
receipt of a request from a party for 10(j) relief, or whenever the
Regional Director believes that such relief is necessary."' In most
cases, however, only a charging party's request for section 10(j) relief
will cause the pre-complaint investigation of an unfair labor practice
charge to be expedited in order to determine if action is warranted. 9
Routine pre-complaint investigations fail to uncover charges which
merit section 10(j) relief until so much time has elapsed since the viola-
tion occurred" that regional attorneys are reluctant to attempt to con-
vince a district court that the "extraordinary remedy" of injunctive
relief is necessary.7' Thus, other factors among the Board's section 10(j)
guidelines being relatively equal, whether a charging party requests in-
junctive relief appears to determine whether the Board even considers
most section 8(a)(3) cases for section 10(j) action.72
A significant exception to this practice occurs, however, when the
charging party alleges that a large number of employees have been
discharged during a union organizing campaign. In such cases it appears
that regional Board officials either expedite the pre-complaint investiga-
tion on their own initiative or institute section 10(j) proceedings despite
the delay caused by customary pre-complaint investigation. 73 Section
for § IOUi) injunctions, see notes 68-72 & accompanying text infra, suggest that it is the
Board's § 10(j) procedures, and not subtle differences in cases discernible only to the NLRB,
which cause these inconsistencies.
0 Compare Fuchs v. Hood Indus., Inc., 471 F. Supp. 186 (D. Mass. 1979) (six employees
discharged during organizing campaign, § 10(j) relief sought), and Barbour v. Central Car-
tage, Inc., Civ. No. 77-C-1631 (N.D. Ill. 1977), vacated as moot 583 F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1978)
(two employees discharged during organizing campaign, § 10j) relief sought), with Servair,
Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 1278 (1979) (16 employees discharged during organizing campaign, § 10j)
relief not sought), and Winter Garden, Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 4 (1978) (organizing campaign, 12
employees discharged, § 10(j) relief not sought).
" CASE HANDLING MANUAL, supra note 52, 3102.
9 Pre-complaint investigation is expedited whenever § 10(j) action is either requested by
a charging party or is deemed advisable by the official investigating the change. Interview
with Ralph Tremain, Deputy Regional Attorney, NLRB, District 23, in Indianapolis, Indiana
(Oct. 23, 1979).
70 In fiscal year 1977, it normally took a regional NLRB office 48 days to complete its
pre-complaint investigation. Nolan & Lehr, supra note 2, at 50.
71 Interview with Ralph Tremain, supra note 69.
7 For a discussion of what the NLRB must prove before a § 10(j) injunction will be
granted by the district court, see text accompanying notes 127-34 infra.
73 See, e.g., Gottfried v. Mayco Plastics, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 1161 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Crain
v. Fabsteel Co., 427 F. Supp. 316 (W.D. La. 1977); Leventhal v. Car-Riv Corp., 96 L.R.R.M.
2899 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
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10(j) relief was sought in every case involving a mass discharge during
an organizing campaign in fiscal years 1977 through 1979."'
The Board's Section 10(j) Practice in Section 8(a)(3) Cases:
An Abuse of Discretion
Congress' intention that the NLRB, through the exercise of its in-
formed discretion, choose for section 10(j) action those unfair labor prac-
tices which cannot adequately be remedied through routine Board pro-
cedures is frustrated by the Board's practice of filing section 10(j) peti-
tions in section 8(a)(3) cases only in the event of a "blockbuster"' 5 viola-
tion or when the charging party requests section 10(j) relief. By failing
to consider the factors outlined in its own guidelines, the Board has
eliminated any value those guidelines might have in assuring that its
selection of cases for section 10(j) action is "reasonably principled.""
This arbitrary practice raises the question of whether the Board has
abused the discretion granted to it under section 10(j) by failing to con-
sider other discriminatory discharge cases for injunctive action.
Abuse of discretion has been defined as "an exercise of discretion in
which a relevant consideration has been given an exaggerated, [or]
'unreasonable' weight at the expense of others .... Discretion implies a
'balancing'; where the result is eccentric, either there has not been a
balancing, or a hidden and mayhap improper motive has been at work.""
The eccentric results in the type of section 8(a)(3) cases chosen for sec-
tion 10(j) action clearly reflect the exaggerated weight that a charging
party's request for section 10(j) relief has been given at the expense of
the other important factors listed in the Board's section 10(j) guidelines.
Judicial Limitations on Abuse of Discretion by the NLRB
Although the Board has "broad discretion to fashion and issue ...
relief adequate to achieve the ends, and effectuate the policies, of the
" Hence there were no mass discharge cases listed in the NLRB INDEX, supra note 64, in
which the Board had not sought a § 10j) injunction.
,- Former General Counsel Irving used this term in denying that the Board seeks § 1Oj)
relief only in cases where there have been flagrant and unusual violations. Speech of former
NLRB General Counsel John S. Irving, Remedies Under the LMRA: An Update, at The
Thirty-Second National Conference on Labor, New York University (June 13, 1978),
reprinted in 4 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 9198 (1978).
Irving's denial is only technically true. The Board's inconsistent record in "average" §
8(a)(3) cases suggests that the NLRB seeks § 10(j) relief of its own volition only in
"blockbuster" cases.
76 McCleod v. General Elec. Co., 257 F. Supp. 690, 708 n.14 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 366 F.2d 847
(2d Cir. 1966), vacated & remanded, 385 U.S. 533 (1967).
" L. JAFFE, supra note 65, at 586.
[Vol. 56:515
LABOR INJUNCTIONS
[NLRA], '" 8 its remedial discretion is not unlimited. Among the
numerous cases in which it has circumscribed the Board's exercise of its
remedial discretion, 9 the Supreme Court held in Detroit Edison Co. v.
NLRB80 that "the rule of deference of the Board's choice of remedy does
not constitute a blank check for arbitrary action."'" Reviewing the exer-
cise of discretionary authority in other contexts, the Court has also held
that an administrative agency cannot fail or decline to exercise the
discretion granted to it by Congress82 and that such discretion should
not be exercised by applying a predetermined policy which precludes
consideration of the facts of each case.
83
Thus, the Supreme Court has held that an administrative agency
78 Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 176 (1973). See also Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941). Though Golden State and Phelps Dodge are cases
involving the Board's remedial powers under § 10(c) of the NLRA, the Board also has broad
discretion regarding whether to seek § 10j) relief. See McCleod v. General Elec. Co., 257 F.
Supp. 690, 708 n.14 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd 366 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1966), vacated & remanded, 385
U.S. 533 (1967).
79 See, e.g., H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970) (Board cannot order remedy
which is contrary to NLRA's policy favoring collective bargaining); Local 60, United Bhd. of
Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651 (1961) (Board cannot order confiscatory remedy);
Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940) (Board cannot order remedies intended on-
ly to deter future violations of NLRA).
10 440 U.S. 301 (1979).
' Id. at 316. The Court had previously reversed an ICC order because it was inconsist-
ent with contemporaneous decisions, Barrett Line v. United States, 326 U.S. 179 (1945), but
upheld an FCC decision despite such inconsistency, FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223 (1946).
For a review of the heated debate among legal scholars as to whether discretionary deci-
sions by administrative agencies are ever reviewable by the courts, see Berger, Ad-
ministrative Arbitrariness-A Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J. 965 (1969). When, however, as in
the present case, abuse results from an agency's failure to exercise its discretion, the Court
has not hesitated to reverse the agency's inconsistent decision and remand the case to the
agency for proper consideration. See, e.g., Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
" See Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954). In Accardi, the United States Board
of Immigration Appeals refused to consider whether to suspend a deportation order of an
alien, contrary to a regulation which required it to make such a consideration. The Court
relied in part on the presence of the regulation, holding that it was as much law as the
statute under which it was made and therefore must be applied.
Since the NLRB has been permitted to formulate its regulations by adjudication rather
than by rulemaking, see NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969), it may "be given
greater freedom by the courts, to ignore or depart from those rules in specific instances
without giving sufficient reasons," Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in
the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 951 (1965). But cf. NLRB
v. Don Juan Co., 178 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1949) (though NLRB is free to depart from rules an-
nounced in prior cases, inadvertant or unexplained departures will not be sustained), affd
after remand, 185 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1950).
0 Mastrapasqua v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 999 (2d. Cir. 1950) (improper for Board of Im-
migration Appeals to deny suspension of deportation order on ground that applicant was
one of class of aliens to which suspension had in past been denied); accord, NLRB v. Pitts-
burgh Plate Glass, Co., 270 F.2d 167, 174 (4th Cir. 1954) (Board decision held arbitrary and
discriminatory because announced policy was followed instead of circumstances of case
being studied when it determined appropriate bargaining unit should exclude craft
workers).
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abuses its discretion if it omits a remedy that has been applied in
similar cases, declines to exercise a specific grant of discretion or ap-
plies a predetermined policy to cases which prevents it from evaluating
the facts of each case. Failing to invoke section 10(j) unless the charging
party so requests means that the Board must inevitably be omitting a
remedy for identical complaints which merely fail to refer to section
10(j). In the majority of discriminatory discharge cases, where there is
no request for injunctive relief, the NLRB fails to exercise the discre-
tion granted it in section 10(j).' By concentrating on blockbuster cases,
the Board is applying a predetermined policy which prevents it from
considering other cases for injunctive relief. The Board's practice in
these cases is thus of the type proscribed by the Supreme Court deci-
sions involving arbitrary action by administrative agencies.
A Scenario for Judicial Intervention
Under the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962,85 an unlawfully discharged
employee could petition a federal district court for an injunction order-
ing the Board to evaluate his section 8(a)(3) complaint for possible sec-
tion 10(j) action." Certification of such a suit as a class action would pre-
vent the suit from becoming moot if the named plaintiff's section 8(a)(3)
complaint were either considered for section 10(j) action or disposed of on
its merits. 7 Such a class action could seek an injunction ordering the
NLRB to reform its section 10(j) procedures so that every section 8(a)(3)
case is considered for possible section 10(j) action.'
Cf. Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways, Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 1978)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The standard of review ... seems to me to require the kind of
scrutiny we use whenever we review a determination by an individual or body entrusted
with discretionary power. We inquire whether the discretion granted has been abused by a
failure to make a reasoned decision.").
" 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976).
, See White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977) (jurisdiction predicated on 28 U.S.C.§ 1361 upheld in suit to require the Social Security Administration (SSA) to conduct its pro-
ceedings with reasonable speed), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978); Frost v. Weinberger, 515
F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976) (jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1361
upheld in suit to require SSA to provide an evidentiary hearing concerning termination of
survivor's benefits). See generally Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and
Venue Act of 1962 and "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action,
81 HARV. L. REV. 308 (1967).
' See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 397-401 (1975) (class action challenging Iowa's one
year residence requirement for instituting divorce suit held not moot for class of persons
plaintiff had been certified to represent, though case would have become moot if plaintiff
had sued only on her own behalf because year had long since expired and she had obtained
a divorce elsewhere). For further discussions of mootness, White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852,
856-58 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978), and Frost v. Weinberger, 515 F.2d 57,
62-65 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976).
" Such broad injunctive relief has been ordered against federal agencies which have
"consciously and expressly adopted ... a general policy which is in effect an abdication of
its statutory duty." Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam)
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Discretionary Immunity
The Board could not protect itself from such judicial review of its sec-
tion 10(j) procedures by relying on the fact that its authority to bring
section 10(j) actions is discretionary. 9 In Nader v. Saxbe, the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals considered the proper role of judicial
review of prosecutorial discretion. The plaintiff had brought an action
under the Mandamus Act to compel the Attorney General and the
United States Attorney's Office "'to exercise their discretion to initiate
prosecutions' "91 against violators of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of
1925.9" The district court had dismissed the plaintiffs complaint on the
grounds that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is immune from
judicial review, or, alternatively, that by declining to bring any prosecu-
tions under the Act, the defendants had exercised their discretion.93 The
appellate court rejected both of these bases for the lower court's action by
(en banc). Adams was a class action suit to compel HEW to enforce Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976), in 17 states. The district court had ordered the
agency to begin enforcing Title VI in those states within two months. Adams v. Richardson,
356 F. Supp. 92, 95 (D.D.C. 1973). Subsequently, the court set schedules for HEW to follow
in acting on all Title VI complaints when it became clear that the agency was not enforcing
Title VI with respect to school districts not covered by the previous order. Adams v.
Weinberger, 391 F. Supp. 269 (D.D.C.) modified sub. nom. Adams v. Mathews, No. 3095-70
(D.D.C. July 17, 1975).
See also Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc. v. Weinberger, 425 F. Supp. 890, 894 (D.D.C. 1975)
(FDA enjoined from allowing new drugs to be marketed without an approved new drug ap-
plication); text accompanying notes 102-04 infra.
8 The argument that enforcement actions of administrative agencies fall within the
"agency discretion exception" to the general rule that agency action is reviewable under
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1976), has been repeatedly rejected
by the courts. See, e.g., Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1161-62 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per
curiam) (en banc), motion for further relief granted sub nom. Adams v. Weinberger, 391 F.
Supp. 269 (D.D.C. 1975), modified sub nom. Adams v. Mathews, No. 3095-70 (D.D.C. July 17,
1975). The exception is a narrow one. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 410 (1971); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1970). "[O]nly upon a showing of
'clear and convincing evidence'" that Congress intended to preclude judicial review should
the courts defer completely to the agency. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,
141 (1967).
Congress did not intend the NLRB's discretionary authority to seek injunctions to be
nonreviewable. Though the General Counsel's office is responsible for filing § 10(j) actions,
the statute gives the Board the power to seek § 10(j) injunctions. The Board exercises its
statutory authority by requiring the General Counsel's office to obtain approval of each
proposed § 10(j) suit. See Memorandum Describing the Authority and Assigned Respon-
sibilities of the General Counsel of the NLRB, 20 FED. REG. 2175 (1955); NLRB CASE HANDL-
ING MANUAL, supra note 52, 3102. The Board's authority to seek § 10(j) relief is clearly
distinguishable from the General Counsel's "final authority" to issue unfair labor practice
complaints, see 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1976), which has been held nonreviewable, see, e.g., Tens-
ing v. NLRB, 519 F.2d 365 (6th Cir. 1975); Terminal Freight Coop. Ass'n v. NLRB, 447 F.2d
1099, 1101-02 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
497 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
g' Id at 677.
Ch. 368, tit. III, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925) (repealed 1971).
'3 See 497 F.2d at 678-79.
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distinguishing "the essentially Executive function of deciding whether a
particular alleged violator should be prosecuted" from the "conventional-
ly judicial determination of whether certain fixed policies ... lie outside
the constitutional and statutory limits of 'prosecutorial discretion.' "I
Other courts have similarly declined to defer unquestioningly to agencies'
discretionary decisions on whether to take prosecutorial action. 5 Judge
Tamm's often quoted 96 statement in Medical Committee for HumanRights
v. SEC7 is representative of the judicial attitude towards the argument
that even arbitrary enforcement decisions are nonreviewable: "The deci-
sions of this court have never allowed the phrase 'prosecutorial discretion'
to be treated as a magical incantation which automatically provides a
shield for arbitrariness." 98
Limited Resources Excuse
An attempt by the NLRB to justify the exercise of its section 10(j)
discretion in only a limited number of cases because its limited
resources will not allow more thorough section 10(j) review procedures
should not satisfy an intervening court either. Attempts by other ad-
ministrative agencies to justify nonenforcement of their statutory man-
dates because of limited appropriations have been rejected by courts
hearing mandamus actions filed by plaintiffs prejudiced by. the agencies'
inaction. 9
For example, the court in Adams v. Califano9 9 directed the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) to take all necessary
Id. at 679.
5 See, e.g., Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (en banc),
motion for further relief granted sub nom. Adams v. Weinberger, 391 F. Supp. 269 (D.D.C.
1975), modified sub nom. Adams v. Mathews, No. 3095-70 (D.D.C. July 17, 1975); NAACP v.
Levi, 418 F. Supp. 1109 (D.D.C. 1976) (motion to dismiss denied when plaintiff claimed FBI
and U.S. Attorney's Office abused discretion by failing to conduct thorough investigation).
" See, e.g., Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676, 680 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1974); NAACP v. Levi, 418
F. Supp. 1109, 1116 (D.D.C. 1976).
" 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
9' Id. at 673.
Two examples are White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 435
U.S. 908 (1978), see text accompanying notes 102-04 infra, and Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v.
Weinberger, 425 F. Supp. 890, 894 (D.D.C. 1975) ("[T]he argument that the FDA lacks the
administrative resources to insure compliance.., cannot be permitted....). See also Note,
Judicial Control of Systemic Inadequacies in Federal Administrative Enforcement 88
YALE L.J. 407, 421 (1978) (suggesting: "[S]ome judicial role is possible even when the agency
enforcement effort is optimal and the inadequacy is due solely to real limitations on
available resources. In such cases a court order may be useful in giving administrators
greater leverage in effectively requesting funds needed for adequate enforcement:').
Administrative costs have also been rejected as a defense for violating constitutional
rights. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688-91 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 656 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633-38 (1969).
" No. 3095-70 (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 1977).
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steps to obtain sufficient resources from Congress to fund HEW's en-
forcement duties under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.01 In
White v. Mathews,'°' HEW was ordered either to expedite the process-
ing of appeals of applicants who had been denied Social Security dis-
ability benefits or to begin making prospective payments to those ap-
plicants whose appeals were not heard within a judicially prescribed
time framework." 3 The court recognized that its order would tax HEW's
resources, but it deemed the statutory right to timely appeals impor-
tant enough to justify the imposition of those costs.' 0 4
Reforms to Eliminate the Board's Arbitrary Section 10(j) Practices
The Board could eliminate the inconsistent results of its current use
of section 10(j) in section 8(a)(3) cases by ending its reliance on charging
party requests for section 10(j) relief to trigger consideration of a case
for possible section 10(j) action. While the NLRB's limited resources
may prevent it from instituting section 10(j) action in every section
8(a)(3) case where it would be useful, uniform application of the section
10(j) guidelines"°5 should result in certain types of discriminatory
discharge cases being consistently chosen for section 10(j) injunctive
proceedings. 6 Consistent choices of certain types of section 8(a)(3) viola-
tions would signal to employees that their statutory rights will be swift-
ly vindicated through injunctive action by the Board. Consistent applica-
tion of section 10(j) would also provide a deterrent against many
employer violations which the current haphazard use of section 10(j)
does not provide.1
0 7
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
'e 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978).
559 F.2d at 858-61.
"0 Id. at 859.
100 See text accompanying notes 57-58 supra.
"' For example, all discriminatory discharge cases during organizational campaigns
"create special remedy problems" within the meaning of the guidelines, see CASE HANDLING
MANUAL, supra note 52, 3102, since the organizational campaign will long be over before
reinstatement can be ordered through the Board's routine investigation, adjudication and
enforcement procedures.
Il, The deterrent effects of § 10(j) injunctions were recognized by Chairman Frank Mc-
Culloch in 1962: "It is the experienced expectation of the Board that violations of the act
can be deterred by indicating a readiness to seek injunctive relief when the incentive to
resist unfair labor practices charges rests on advantage of time and delay." McCulloch,
New Problems in the Administration of the Labor-Management Relations Act- The Taft-
Hartley Injunction, 16 Sw. L.J. 82, 99 (1962). But McCulloch was only a reluctant convert to
increased § 10(j) use, announcing that the Board would seek more § 10(j) injunctions only
after the Pucinski Committee urged him to make this reform. See Comment, supra note 4,
at 1034-36.
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JUDICIAL STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING WHEN SECTION 10(j)
RELIEF IS APPROPRIATE
Just as section 10(j) fails to give the NLRB any statutory criteria for
determining when its relief should be sought,1" 8 the section also fails to
provide the courts with a standard for determining when section 10(j)
relief should be granted.' 9 Like the Board, the courts have developed
standards for deciding when section 10(j) injunctions are proper. Unlike
the Board, however, the courts have not developed uniform standards,"0
and those endorsed by several of the circuit courts of appeals are
demonstrably inappropriate.
The Development of Conflicting Section 10(j) Standards
From 1948 to 1962, when section 10(j) petitions were rarely filed by
the NLRB,"' federal district courts granted section 10(j) relief if the
Board demonstrated that there was "reasonable cause to believe" that
an unfair labor practice had been committed."' During this period,
judges in effect deferred to the Board on the question of the propriety
of section 10(j) relief. Since the early 1960's, when the Board began to
seek section 10(j) relief more frequently, 3 judges have continued to re-
quire a showing that there is reasonable cause to believe the NLRA has
been violated,"' but the courts have also imposed additional re-
' See note 3 supra.
'' Section 10(j) states only that the court has "jurisdiction to grant the Board such tem-
porary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper." 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1976). For
the full text of that section, see note 3 supra
,ll The Supreme Court has noted that there are conflicting § 101j) standards among the
courts of appeals but has not had an opportunity to decide which are appropriate. In Mc-
Cleod v. General Elec. Co., 87 S. Ct. 5 (1966) (Harlan, J.) (mem.) Justice Harlan granted a
stay of the Second Circuit's judgment, 366 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1966), which had set aside the
district court's § 10(j) order to General Electric to bargain with a multi-union bargaining
committee: "The underlying issue in this case-the standards governing the application of §
10(j)-has not heretofore been passed upon by this Court and is of continuing importance in
the proper administration of the Labor Act." 87 S. Ct. at 6.
After the Supreme Court granted certiorari in McCleod, the parties reached agreement
on the terms of a new contract. The Court therefore remanded the case to the district court
to determine whether the issue was moot. 385 U.S. 533 (1967).
11, See note 4 supra.
112 See, e.g., Johnston v. Evans, 223 F. Supp. 766, 769 (E.D.N.C. 1963) ("This court, to
determine whether injunctive relief is warranted, needs [sic] only find that the Regional
Director has reasonable cause to believe that an unfair labor practice has been
committed."); accord, Alpert v. Trailways, Inc., 51 Lab. Cas. 33,202 (D. Mass. 1965); Getreau
v. Gas Appliance Supply Corp., 58 L.R.R.M. 2189 (S.D. Ohio 1963); Boire v. Tiffany Tile
Corp., 47 Lab. Cas. 28,959 (M.D. Fla. 1963); Fusco v. Kaase Baking Co., 205 F. Supp. 465
(N.D. Ohio 1962); Kennedy v. Telecomputing, 43 Lab. Cas. 25,630 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
"' See note 4 supra.
11 The two leading cases on the question of judicial standards for § 10(j) relief, Angle v.
Sacks, 382 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1967), and McCleod v. General Elec. Co., 366 F.2d 847 (2d Cir.
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quirements that the Board must satisfy in order to show that injunctive
relief is just and proper."' The courts' initial reassertion of equitable
discretion in deciding whether to issue section 10(j) injunctions was in
accord with the settled judicial attitude toward administrative agency
petitions for injunctive relief."' The just and proper standards later
developed by some courts, however, violate established principles
governing the equitable discretion of courts deciding such petitions.
The Judiciary's Proper Role in Deciding Statutorily Authorized
Petitions for Injunctive Relief
In Hecht Co. v. Bowles,"' the Supreme Court outlined the scope of an
equity court's discretion when ruling on an administrative agency's peti-
tion for a preliminary injunction which is authorized in the act the agen-
cy is charged with enforcing. Hecht involved a petition for an injunction
by the Administrator of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942118 to
enjoin illegal practices of a retailer. Despite the statutory imperative
that upon a showing of illegality the court "shall" issue an injunction,"'
the Supreme Court held that the lower court retained its equitable
power to deny injunctive relief in the face of the Administrator's un-
disputed showing of illegal practices."' The Court also held, however,
that the trial court's "discretion ... must be exercised in the light of the
large objectives of the Act. For the standards of public interest, not the
requirements of private litigation, measure the propriety and need for
injunctive relief in these cases." '21
The Supreme Court's holding that the policies of the authorizing act
should govern a court's decision whether to grant petitions for injunc-
tions by administrative agencies has been followed by several courts
hearing petitions for injunctive relief from various agencies." Several
federal statutes besides the NLRA provide for the issuance of tem-
porary injunctions or other interlocutory relief before a decision on the
merits by either an agency or a court."' Temporary relief has been
1966), vacated & remanded, 385 U.S. 533 (1967), adopt conflicting standards, see text accom-
panying notes 127-29 infra, but both retain the "reasonable cause" requirement.
"' See text accompanying notes 126-29 infra.
"I See notes 117-20 & accompanying text infra.
117 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
C Oh. 26, 56 Stat. 23 (1942) (repealed 1946).
"' Section 205(a) of the Act stated that the Administrator "may make application to the
appropriate court for an order enjoining [a violation of the Act], or for an order enforcing
compliance." Id § 205(a), 56 Stat. 32.
1" 321 U.S. at 331.
121 Id.
In See, e.g., SEC. v. Torr, 87 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1937); United States v. Chrysler Corp., 232
F. Supp. 651 (D.N.J. 1964); SEC v. General Security Co., 216 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
11 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1976); id. § 25; id § 53; id. § 70f; id. § 77t(b); id. § 79r(f); id. §
687c(a); 16 id. § 825m(a); 29 id § 217; id § 308(f); 42 id § 1971(c); id. § 2280; id. § 2000a-3(a).
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issued under these statutes by courts which have applied their
equitable discretion in a way which demonstrates that they recognize
their role as enforcers of the congressional policies underlying these
acts."'24
The legislative history of sections 10(j) and 10(l) of the LMRA
demonstrates that the courts were to play a similar role as enforcers of
the national labor laws."5 The jurisdiction to issue injunctions in labor
disputes which was reinvested in the federal courts by sections 10(j) and
10(l) cast the equitable discretion of these courts in a form different
from that which they exercise in hearing petitions for equitable relief by
private litigants. The courts were assigned the limited duty of assuring
effective enforcement of Board remedies for both the new union unfair
labor practices which were to be enjoined under section 10(l) and the un-
fair labor practices defined by section 8(a) of the NLRA, which the
Board may seek to enjoin under section 10(j).
Current Judicial Standards for Determining Whether Section 10(j)
Relief is Just and Proper
Despite the legislative history and settled judicial standards to guide
the courts in the exercise of their equitable discretion in section 10(j)
suits, several courts of appeals have endorsed "just and proper stan-
dards" that are variants of the centuries-old standards used in deciding
petitions for temporary injunctions by private litigants." The NLRB
has been required to demonstrate, in addition to a reasonable cause
showing, that the case is of "an extraordinary nature"'" or that a sec-
tion 10(j) injunction is necessary to "preserve the status quo""' or to
12 In SEC v. May, 134 F. Supp. 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), the district court issued a pre-
liminary injunction against a corporation which had failed to meet SEC requirements
regarding the solicitation of proxies for a stockholders' meeting:
[Section 20(b) of the Securities Act of 1933] gives the District Courts power to
enjoin, pursuant to complaint by the Commission, acts or practices which con-
stitute or will constitute a violation of the Securities and Exchange Act....
The equity jurisdiction conferred by the statute embraces all power necessary
to enforce effectively the provisions of the Securities Acts.
Id. at 258.
In FTC v. Rhodes Pharmacal Co., 191 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1951), the appellate court reversed
a district court's denial of injunctive relief sought under § 13(a) of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(a) (1976). The court reaffirmed an earlier holding that § 13(a)
"was a necessary part of the plan to prevent fraud and fraudulent commerce through
fraudulent advertisements, and was written for the purpose of preventing the ineffectuality
of proceedings before the Commission." 191 F.2d at 747. See also SEC v. Capital Gains
Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963) (publication of scalping practices); SEC v. O'Hara Re-election
Comm., 28 F. Supp. 523 (D. Mass. 1939) (cancellation of proxies).
1 See notes 19, 40-48 & accompanying teit supra.
" For a review of those standards, see Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARv.
L. REV. 994, 997-1026 (1965).
1I E.g., Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Meter, 385 F.2d 265, 270 (8th Cir. 1967).
1 E.g., Seeler v. Trading Port, Inc., 517 F.2d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 1975); McCleod v. General
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"prevent irreparable harm."" Despite the Supreme Court's holding in
Hecht Co. v. Bowles 3 ° that such private injunction standards are inap-
propriate in weighing administrative agency petitions for injunctive
relief,"' these standards have been applied, often in combination, to
erect an insurmountable obstacle to the attainment of section 10(j)
relief. As a consequence, section 10(j) injunctions have been denied in
cases where they could have served as a means of assuring effective en-
forcement of NLRA policies.
In Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Meter,' the Eighth Cir-
cuit reversed a section 10(j) order which required that the company
bargain with a multi-employer negotiating committee, stating that "§
10(j) is reserved for a more serious and extraordinary set of cir-
cumstances."' 3l Almost two years later, after the Board had heard and
decided the case on its merits, the same court enforced the Board's
order that the company negotiate with the expanded committee." The
district court's refusal to issue a section 10(j) injunction had allowed the
company to accomplish its unlawful objective of refusing to bargain with
the employees' chosen representatives for two years.
Similarly, the district courts in Mack v. Air Express International'3'
and Crain v. Fabsteell' refused to order employers to reinstate
unlawfully discharged employees because the status quo could not be
restored without forcing the employer to discharge employees hired to
replace the discriminatees. These courts reasoned that temporary
frustration of the discharged employees' rights was preferable to re-
quiring the discharge of the present employees. 37 The courts' analysis in
these cases was misdirected because of their reluctance to alter the
status quo and their fear that they might cause irreparable harm to the
employer and the replacement employees while trying to prevent the
union and its supporters from suffering such damage."' Labor disputes,
however, unlike commercial transactions that may be involved in private
Elec. Co., 366 F.2d 847, 850 (2d Cir. 1966), vacated & remanded, as moot 385 U.S. 533 (1967);
Crain v. Fabsteel Co., 427 F. Supp. 316, 318 (W.D. La. 1977).I E.g., McCleod v. General Elec. Co., 366 F.2d 847, 850 (2d Cir. 1966), vacated & remand-
ed, 385 U.S. 533 (1967); Johnston v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 341 F.2d 891, 892 (4th Cir. 1965);
Fuchs v. Steel-Fab, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 385 (D. Mass. 1973); Kaynard v. Laurence Rigging,
Inc., 80 L.R.R.M. 2600 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
"3 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
" See text accompanying notes 117-21 supra.
' 385 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1967).
" Id. at 270.
1 Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 415 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1969).
23 471 F. Supp. 1119 (NJ). Ga. 1979).
"N 427 F. Supp. 316 (W.D. La. 1977).
"' 471 F. Supp. at 1124; 427 F. Supp. at 318.
1 See also Siegel v. Marina City Co., 428 F. Supp. 1090, 1093 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (reinstate-
ment order denied and bargaining order refused where "[a] preliminary injunction could not
preserve the status quo").
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injunction suits, cannot be frozen in mid-course in order that justice may
eventually be done. Judicial intervention in labor disputes inevitably
alters the status quo and irreparably disadvantages one party by
assisting the other.139
Rather than ignoring this historical reality, the Taft-Hartley Con-
gress in section 10(l) sought to take advantage of the status quo altering
effects of injunctions by making them mandatory in secondary boycotts
and jurisdictional disputes. By requiring the issuance of injunctions
against these union unfair labor practices, the congressional majority in-
tended to re-establish equality of bargaining power between manage-
ment and labor.14 The discretion to seek injunctions against employer
unfair labor practices granted to the NLRB by section 10(j) should also
be understood as a grant of authority to alter the status quo. By effec-
tively enforcing the rights guaranteed by the Act in a specific case
through the issuance of a section 10(j) injunction, a district court is put-
ting into practice the policy judgments enacted in the NLRA. The Act
itself alters the relationship between management and labor.4'
If a district court orders an employer to reinstate a wrongfully
discharged employee immediately, the court has not simply re-
established the status quo that existed before the discharge but rather
has demonstrated to the employee, his co-workers and the employer
that the employees' rights to organize and bargain collectively'42 will be
protected. Timely reinstatement of a discriminatorily discharged
employee will, in accordance with the purposes of the NLRA, encourage
the exercise of section 7 rights' and thereby alter the relationship be-
tween employees and management. On the other hand, if injunctive
relief is denied and reinstatement is not ordered until years after a sec-
'" This effect of labor injunctions was one of the reasons advanced in 1930 for
eliminating them:
In labor cases . . . complicating factors enter. The injunction cannot
preserve the so-called status quo; the situation does not remain in equilibrium
awaiting judgment upon full knowledge .... Choice is not between irreparable
damage to one side and compensable damage to the other. The law's conun-
drum is which side should bear the risk of unavoidable irreparable damage.
F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 5, at 201.
10 See text accompanying notes 29-41 supra.
1 The Wagner Act brought to fruition a revolution in national labor
policy-worker-employees were to be protected in their rights to organize and
bargain collectively through freely chosen representatives. -Congress found
that the denial of employee rights led to strikes and unrest which seriously in-
terfered with the flow of interstate commerce. The Wagner Act sought
socioeconomic reform by use of the traditional American political device of
checks and balances. It was an industrial relations "constitution" recognizing
and guaranteeing employee rights.
McClintock, The Unreviewable Power of the General Counsel-Partial Enforcement of the
Labor Ac4 12 GONZ. L. REV. 79, 82-83 (1976).
141 See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
143 Id
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tion 8(a)(3) violation, the message conveyed to management and labor is
that section 7 rights can be violated with impunity. Whether the district
courts should alter the status quo, thereby creating the potential for ir-
reparable damage to one party by protecting the rights of the other, is
not a question for the judiciary.'44 In passing sections 10(j) and 10(l) Con-
gress expressed its judgment that the national labor policies enacted in
the NLRA and LMRA require that the Board be able to obtain speedy
protection of labor and management rights through the use of tem-
porary injunctions.'
The "Public Interest" Obstacle
Two judicial standards which have evolved under section 10(j)
demonstrate an appreciation that Congress, by enacting sections 10(j)
and 10(l), was creating a statutory scheme by which the courts and the
NLRB were jointly to enforce the federal labor laws. These standards
require only that the Board make a reasonable cause showing and that
it prove that injunctive relief is in the public interest ' or is necessary
"to prevent frustration of the basic remedial purpose of the act."'47
Derived from interpretations of the legislative purpose of section 10(j), s4 8
.. Judicial reluctance to grant § 10(j) injunctions has, however, been widespread: 33 of
the 93 petitions for § 10(j) relief from 1974 to 1979 were denied. Irving, supra note 4, at
15,943. Of the 60 injunctions issued under the section during the same period, the courts did
not always grant the "full extent of the affirmative relief sought by the Board." Id The
relief obtained sometimes amounted to only a cease and desist order. See, e.g., Mack v. Air
Express Int'l, 471 F. Supp. 1119 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
Perhaps this judicial reluctance is based on a misinterpretation of the legislative purpose
of § 10(j) or a misapprehension of the appropriate judicial standard for weighing ad-
ministrative agencies' petitions for injunction relief. The ample legislative history available
to guide the courts in their interpretation of the purpose of § 10j) and the clear standards
established for deciding agencies' petitions for injunctions suggest that a more accurate ex-
planation for the federal district courts' antagonism towards § 10(j) may be the fear that
judicial petitions will bring an onslaught of injunctive actions. If such apprehension
underlies the judiciary's attitude towards § 10(j), it is unfounded. Of the unfair labor prac-
tice cases where the Board authorized § 10(j) action from 1974 to 1979, over 45% were settl-
ed before the § 10(j) petition was decided by the court. Irving, supra note 4, at 15,943.
", See note 19 supra.
", Eisenbert v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 519 F.2d 138, 142 (3d Cir. 1975). See also Kaynard
v. Steel Fabricators Ass'n, 95 L.R.R.M. 2015 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Squillacote v. UAW Local 578,
383 F. Supp. 491, 492 (E.D. Wis. 1974) ("The only real interest intended to be protected by
10(j) injunctive proceedings is the public's interest.").
"' Squillacote v. Local 248, Meat & Allied Food Workers, 534 F.2d 735, 744 (7th Cir.
1976). See also Sacks v. Davis & Hemphill, Inc., 71 L.R.R.M. 2126 (4th Cir. 1969); Angle v.
Sacks, 382 F.2d 655, 660-61 (10th Cir. 1967); Johansen v. Queen Mary Restaurants, 86
L.R.R.M. 2813 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Humprey v. Retired Persons Pharmacy, 84 L.R.R.M. 2599
(D.D.C. 1973).
,' See, e.g., Squillacote v. UAW Local 578, 383 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (protecting
the public interest seen as proper interpretation of legislative intent); Squillacote v. Local
248, Meat & Allied Food Workers, 534 F.2d 735 (7th Cir. 1976) (frustration of remedies stan-
dard seen as proper interpretation of legislative intent).
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these standards follow the requirement stated in Hecht Co. v. Bowles...
that judicial discretion in statutory injunction suits be exercised in light
of the policy of the act which provides for the injunction.
Unfortunately, the courts which have applied these standards have
not always understood the dual nature of the public interest protected
by the NLRA. 150 In an early NLRA case, 1' the Supreme Court succinctly
summarized the policies of the Act and the means by which those
policies are effectuated:
[T]he fundamental policy of the Act is to safeguard the rights of
self-organization and collective bargaining, and thus by the promotion
of industrial peace to remove obstructions to the free flow of com-
merce as defined by the Act .... [T]he purpose of the Act is to pro-
mote peaceful settlements of disputes by providing legal remedies for
the invasion of the employee's rights."'
Unless there are effective remedies for violations of the NLRA, the
Act's scheme for assuring industrial peace is unworkable.'- The public
interest standard should be applied, therefore, so that it reflects what
the frustration of remedies test makes explicit-the public's interest in
the peaceful resolution of labor disputes can be achieved only through
effective protection of employee and management rights guaranteed by
the federal labor laws. When the Board petitions for section 10(j) relief,
the courts should determine only whether there is reasonable cause to
believe that an unfair labor practice has been committed and that in-
junctive relief is necessary to remedy the violation. More restrictive
judicial requirements frustrate the congressional intent underlying sec-
tion 10(j) and are contrary to established principles for judicial review of
administrative agency petitions for statutorily authorized injunctive
relief.
CONCLUSION
Section 10(j) was enacted to enable the NLRB to obtain injunctive
relief to remedy unfair labor practices which it could not resolve quickly
enough through its usual procedures. The Board has failed to develop
321 U.S. 321 (1944).
150 See Jaffe, The Public Right Dogma in Labor Board Cases, 59 HARV. L. REV. 720
(1946); Comment, The Charging Party Before the NLRB: A Private Right in the Public In-
terest 32 U. CHi. L. REv. 786 (1965).
... NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
15 Id. at 257-58 (emphasis added). Since the LMRA, the Act serves to protect employers'
rights as well. See also H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 103 (1970).
" "Remedies are of paramount importance in effectuating the policies of the National
Labor Relations Act. It is idle to speak about rights without remedies, for they are the
means by which rights conferred by the Act are protected." Irving, supra note 52, at 349.
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procedures which assure that all section 8(a)(3) cases are reviewed for
possible section 10(j) action. Many section 8(a)(3) cases have been ar-
bitrarily left to proceed slowly through the Board's investigative and
adjudicatory processes because the Board consistently seeks section
10(j) relief only in extraordinary cases, where the Board's position is
enhanced by the "blockbuster" character of the violation, or in cases
where the Board can present an "average" section 8(a)(3) case to a court
quickly because a charging party's request for section 10(j) relief has
triggered expeditious Board action. Moreover, many courts have
developed overly restrictive standards for weighing section 10(j) peti-
tions which are inconsistent with the standards governing judicial
discretion in statutory injunction suits and which frustrate the purpose
of section 10(j).
Inconsistencies in the use of section 10(j) by the NLRB could be
mitigated if the Board would review every section 8(a)(3) case for poten-
tial section 10(j) action. Application of the Board's guidelines to each
case would enable it to initiate section 10(j) proceedings consistently in
those cases most in need of quick remedial action. If the courts would
then grant section 10(j) relief in such cases, requiring the Board to
demonstrate only that there is reasonable cause to believe an unfair
labor practice has been committed and that injunctive relief is
necessary to remedy the violation, section 10(j) would reinforce the
NLRA's scheme for ensuring industrial peace by protecting employee
and management rights.
RANDAL L. GAINER
1981]

